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JAPAN’S APPROACH TO ASIA PACIFIC ECONOMIC
COOPERATION
Since emerging as a leading industrial economy, Japan has played an important role in
promoting Asia Pacific economic cooperation. Japan has been instrumental in every major
initiative in economic cooperation in the region over the past three decades, including the
Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum launched in 1989. Japan’s commitment
to free trade, reinforced by its own experience of discriminatory trade policies in the
immediate postwar period, has made it a strong advocate of the principle of ‘open regional-
ism’ on which APEC is founded. Commitment to this principle has provided the basis for a
process of unilateral liberalisation of trade, including agreed time frames, which allows the
developing economies of the Asia Pacific region to progress towards free trade in a flexible
manner and provides some protection against ‘free riders’. The strength of this commitment
will assist member economies to counter pressure for preferential trading arrangements and
facilitate the extension of free trade to sectors which involve cooperation with economies
outside the Asia Pacific region.
Introduction
While developments over the past year have raised many questions about the immediate
prospects for East Asia’s economic growth, the force of East Asian industrialisation has
already transformed the contours of world economic power and influence (Drysdale and Elek,
1997). Japan was at the leading edge of East Asian industrialisation. In the postwar period,
Japan’s economy emerged to join the same league as the industrial economies of North
America and Europe. The new role that Japan began to assume more clearly in the 1980s was
defined in a pluralist structure of economic power, encompassing the effective representation
of broader Asia Pacific and global interests, as well as those of the United States and Europe
(Funabashi, 1995, Ch. 9).
Strong commitment to these regional and global goals has provided the stimulus for
every major initiative for economic cooperation in the Asia Pacific region for more than 30
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years, from the establishment of the Pacific Basin Economic Council and the Pacific Trade and
Development conference series, through to the foundation of the Pacific Economic Coopera-
tion Council (PECC) and the APEC forums. In all of these initiatives Japan played a crucial
role, engaging the Association of South East Asian Nations countries and winning the support
of the United States for the PECC and later the APEC initiative (Drysdale, 1988; Terada,
1998).
The establishment of APEC was part of the global response to the need for regional
structures in the Asia Pacific, notable for their paucity compared with those in the Atlantic.
Asia Pacific community-building was needed to cope with the realities of growing economic
interdependence (APEC, 1993), and to allow Asia Pacific governments to contribute to
collective leadership to shape a new global order following the end of the Cold War (Funabashi,
1997, Ch. 9; Drysdale, 1991). For these reasons, Japan has nurtured the APEC process, ‘a
novel experiment in regionalism with global objectives’ (Drysdale and Elek, 1997, p. 4).
Central principles
At the core of the APEC philosophy is the idea of ‘open regionalism’ (Funabashi, 1995, p. 3).
From its beginnings, APEC ‘was not to be an economic bloc or legally bound free trade area
like the European Community or the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)’;
rather, APEC ‘sought to realise a vision of global free trade, driven by the liberalisation of the
Asia Pacific region’s dynamic economies’ (Funabashi, 1995, p. 3).
The objective of promoting economic consultation and cooperation among Asia Pacific
governments was essentially a conservative one, to preserve the conditions needed to sustain
the positive trends of rising prosperity and the productive integration of the region’s
economies (Garnaut, 1996, Ch. 1). Hence, APEC was born in 1989 out of deep concerns shared
by East Asian and Western Pacific economies about the fate of the global trade regime and
the slow progress of multilateral trade negotiations in the Uruguay Round during the 1980s.
Japan and the East Asian countries understood their stake in the strength and
continuity of an open trading system, based upon the principle of nondiscrimination in trade
embedded in Article 1 of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. This was why the idea
of open regionalism came to define the approach to the development of APEC and Asia Pacific
integration from its beginnings.
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The idea of open regionalism is deeply rooted in the history of Japan’s support for APEC
(Terada, 1998). Japan’s experience of discriminatory trade policies during the interwar period
is seared into Japanese memory, and nondiscrimination in trade policy stands out as the
central guiding principle of Japan’s postwar international trade diplomacy. Takeo Miki, one
of the early advocates of Asia Pacific economic cooperation, declared that ‘it would be an act
of suicide on our part to create an exclusive and closed trading bloc in the Pacific area’ (Miki,
1968). A little over a decade later, the Ohira Study Group concluded that:
a regionalism that is open to the world, not one that is exclusive and closed, is
the first characteristic of our concept … a regional community without a
perspective for a global community has no possibility of development and
prosperity’ (Japan Pacific Cooperation Study Group, 1980, p. 19).
These ideas were first given precision in English at the Pacific Community Seminar convened
by Sir John Crawford at the initiative of Prime Ministers Ohira of Japan and Fraser of
Australia at the Australian National University in September 1980 (Garnaut, 1996, p. 6).
They became entrenched through the work of PECC after 1980 and were the intellectual
foundation on which APEC was launched in Canberra in November 1989 (Crawford and Seow,
1981; Drysdale, Elek and Soesastro, 1998).
Precept to practice
APEC’s agenda has evolved around giving substance to the idea of open regionalism. The
APEC meetings held in Seattle in 1993 elevated the process of cooperation to the highest level
of government. At the initiative of US President Clinton, an informal APEC leaders meeting
was held in conjunction with the established ministerial meetings. The leaders issued an
Economic Vision Statement which contained three elements. The first was an affirmation of
the goal of reaching an open multilateral trading system and the determination of Asia Pacific
leaders to take steps to produce the strongest possible outcome in the Uruguay Round (APEC,
1993).
The APEC leaders meeting the following year, held in Bogor, Indonesia, produced the
Bogor Declaration of Common Resolve, which set the goals of achieving free and open trade
and investment in the region by 2010 for developed member economies and 2020 for
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developing members (APEC, 1994). The commitment by leaders to achieve free and open trade
by a certain date was an important milestone in APEC’s development.
In spite of the principles set out in the Bogor declaration, there remained some
ambiguities about the modality for achieving the APEC goal of free and open trade and
investment in the region. These arose in proposals, including those put forward by the APEC
Eminent Persons Group (Eminent Persons Group, 1994), which amounted to advocacy of a
process of negotiated liberalisation among APEC members along the lines of a conventional
free trade area, whose benefits could be extended to non-members only on a mutually
reciprocated basis and in a way that would eliminate the problem of ‘free riding’, either within
APEC itself or by non-members, notably European countries. The task of clarifying these
issues rested with Japan, as the chair of APEC, in 1995.
APEC formally espoused open regionalism at its Osaka meetings in 1995. The Osaka
Action Agenda was premised on the voluntary nature of the APEC process, an essential
corollary of the idea of open regionalism (APEC, 1995). APEC members’ commitment to the
unilateral liberalisation of barriers to trade and investment is a necessary condition of open
regionalism. Efforts to achieve such liberalisation are not seen as concessions for exchange
in a negotiating process, but their collective effect (concerted unilateral liberalisation)
reinforces regional trade liberalisation, consistently with Article 1 of the World Trade
Organisation (WTO) and without requiring an Article 24 style discriminatory agreement
(Drysdale, Elek and Soesastro, 1998).
Equally important, in the context of Asia Pacific community building, is the sense of
comfort that this modality provides to APEC member economies, by allowing flexibility in the
implementation of liberalisation commitments not based on uniformly negotiated schedules.
APEC’s trade liberalisation and facilitation agenda is adopted and implemented by the
decisions of individual governments. Each member’s liberalisation program is entered into
voluntarily, in accordance with common guidelines for APEC cooperation adopted by
consensus within the APEC process. Unilateral efforts are reviewed and monitored within
APEC. As agreed in Osaka, members’ Individual Action Plans cover trade liberalisation and
trade and investment facilitation measures. In addition, Collective Action Plans raise the
possibility of non-discriminatory sectoral liberalisation in sectors of special interest to APEC
members – an option that was taken up at the Vancouver APEC meetings of November 1997.
In Manila, APEC members also laid the foundation for the adoption of the Information
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Technology Agreement at the WTO Ministerial Meetings held in Singapore in late 1996 and
subsequently (APEC, 1996).
In brief, there are three reasons why Japan and other Western Pacific countries have
eschewed discrimination in developing Asia Pacific regional cooperation (Garnaut, 1996).
First, the trading interests of East Asian and Pacific economies extend beyond APEC,
including to Europe. A conventional free trade area strategy towards liberalisation would
deter internationally-oriented reform in the region’s developing economies, and introduce
tension into relations with neighbours and major partners outside the region. Second, trade
discrimination involves the unnecessary cost of trade diversion, complicated in the Asia
Pacific by the likelihood of associated high political costs both within and outside the region
(Garnaut and Drysdale, 1994, Ch. 5). Third, there is the sheer impracticability of undertaking
regional trade liberalisation in such a diverse region via a conventional discriminatory free
trade area of the kind sanctioned by the WTO – the most likely outcome would be a ‘dirty bloc’,
in which there would be backsliding into partial preferential liberalisation, with various
alliances of players picking and choosing the sectors to be liberalised, at various times
(Drysdale, Vines and House, 1998, p. 7).
APEC has already become more than just a loose community of like-minded economies
encouraging each other in a process of unilateral trade and investment liberalisation. It now
provides the structure under which trade, technical cooperation, financial cooperation and,
to a lesser extent, political tensions within the Asia Pacific region are managed.
Conflicting paradigms across the Pacific
APEC has special potential to be helpful in trans-Pacific relations. The tendency of the United
States to conduct aspects of its trade relations bilaterally, and to seek bilateral reciprocity in
its trade negotiations, is widely recognised. It is also understandable. For a hegemonic power
– which the United States still is – there is a natural temptation to use muscle to force market
opening (in the name of both self-interest and the general good). APEC has usefully provided
a forum in which tensions between the United States and Japan, resulting from such actions
by the United States, can be diffused and calmed. The APEC Summit in Manila also provided
a congenial setting for presidential talks aiming to set United States–China relations on a
more productive course. APEC has also established its worth in managing trans-Pacific
tensions by serving as a vehicle for China’s liberalisation agenda and supporting China’s entry
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into the WTO. In 1997, APEC was also effective in terms of managing the regional financial
crisis while keeping the trade liberalisation agenda on track.
Yet, during the last 15 years, there have been developments in US trade diplomacy that
are potentially less benign for the prospects of open regionalism in APEC. These develop-
ments were born of US impatience with the process of multilateral negotiation, US
frustration concerning its large bilateral relationships, such as those with Japan and Europe,
and the challenge presented by the single-market initiative in the European Union.
Whether or not the US display of interest in preferential trade arrangements was
initially largely tactical, regionalism has taken on a life of its own among US policymakers
(Saxonhouse, 1997, p. 2). For example, it is an active issue in the consideration of a new ‘fast
track’ negotiating authority for the US administration (Bergsten, 1997).
This is the US policy context in which APEC was launched. It is worth remembering that
it was also the policy context in which Malaysia’s Prime Minister Mahathir first put forward
the idea of an East Asian Economic Caucus – to be, among other things, a tactical defence
against North American regionalism. Of more relevance here, it is also the policy context in
which a number of Americans, both within and outside of government, have been eager to
maintain a preferential trading arrangement option for APEC (Saxonhouse, 1997, p. 4).
Bergsten (1997, p. 12) suggests a modification of open regionalism which qualifies its
essential ‘most favoured nation’ feature. Under his scheme, APEC members would afford
liberalisation only to those outsiders who offered similar liberalisation themselves. The
requirement for reciprocal liberalisation has earned this approach the label ‘reciprocitarianism’.
The element of conditionality in Bergsten’s formula means that the final choice of whether
free trade or a free trade area was the endpoint of reform would be left until tariff reduction
reached its final stages. Flamm and Lincoln (1997) echo Bergsten’s critique of ‘open
regionalism’, strictly defined, in a recent tract.
There are a number of vital objections to Bergsten’s proposal (Drysdale, Vines and
House, 1998, p. 19). Foremost, it is entirely unfeasible, in that there is no collective action
mechanism by which this proposal could be carried through within the loose APEC grouping.
Under Article 24 of the WTO, a formal agreement and an agreed timetable would be required.
APEC has eschewed any moves in this direction.
APEC is not founded on an international agreement, nor does it possess any supranational
authority that would allow it to take collective action of the kind presumed in such
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calculations. There is no prospect that this will change, given the approach of Japan, East
Asian and Western Pacific members to Asia Pacific economic cooperation.
Drysdale, Elek and Soesastro (1998) propose that a positive response to APEC’s lead on
trade liberalisation, in which the European Union committed itself to eliminating all border
barriers to trade and investment by 2020, would resolve the ‘free rider’ problem, about which
Bergsten worries, and set the stage for effective cooperation among both groups to achieve free
and open trade and investment between them as well as within each region.
This relates to the question of whether voluntary cooperation will be adequate to deal
with ‘sensitive’ sectors. Will it be possible to achieve deep liberalisation of agricultural trade
in Northeast Asia, for example, without the pressures of hard negotiations and reciprocal
concessions? The answer to this question may well be ‘no’. But, consistently with the objectives
and character of Asia Pacific economic cooperation, it is possible to plan ahead and deal with
the liberalisation of some sensitive sectors in which there is also substantial extra-APEC
interest within the WTO. This should begin a few years down the track, after the Uruguay
Round commitments have been digested but before the APEC industrial economy free-trade
deadline is reached in 2010. This strategy also presents a way of dealing with US concern
about European ‘free riding’, and offers the opportunity to lock Europe into a liberalisation
of trade barriers comparable to that taking place within APEC.
Further, there is the question of whether the APEC formula can accommodate the US
lust for reciprocity from both other APEC countries and non APEC members. Over the next
few years or so, this will not be a major problem. In practice, the United States will itself
largely ‘free ride’ within APEC , as international liberalisation and reform continue to have
most effect in East Asia and the Western Pacific (Garnaut, 1996, Ch. 1). This was reflected
in the minimalist Individual Action Plan presented by the United States in Manila. The
United States can best liberalise its remaining border measures in the context of broader
WTO negotiations – perhaps during the Millennium Round advocated by European Commis-
sion Vice President Sir Leon Brittan.
These reservations do not, in any way, suggest that APEC is simply a holding operation.
Quite the reverse: they underline the importance of APEC in providing a vehicle for active
trade and investment liberalisation when this is an urgent priority for the industrialising
economies of East Asia and other economies in the Western Pacific, so that they do not have




The defining concept of Asia Pacific cooperation is the Japanese and Australian idea of ‘open
regionalism’. Properly understood, as it has been conceived and implemented within APEC,
it encompasses ‘integrative processes that contain no element of exclusion against outsiders’
(Garnaut and Drysdale, 1994, p. 2). It underpins the agenda for liberalisation in APEC, with
the first principles of the WTO as its reference point and the WTO as its ultimate agent. It
collides with support, in the United States and elsewhere, for discriminatory regionalism.
The resolution of this clash is still being played out in the theatre of Asia Pacific diplomacy
(Drysdale, 1997).
As Saxonhouse (1997, p. 11) observes, the outcome of fifteen years of US flirtation with
regionalist trade policies could possibly be a network of preferential trade arrangements
centred on the United States, competing with a similar set of arrangements centred on the
European Union. Such an outcome would be politically dangerous and costly in economic
terms.
The position of Japan and East Asia in this equation is crucial. If the role of Japan and
East Asia in APEC is any guide, a more likely outcome could be a strengthened multilateral
system based on the WTO. East Asia, through the Asia Europe Meeting process, has also
strategically engaged Europe as a balancing presence. Europe is a willing partner – despite
contradictions in its own trade diplomacy towards its East and its South – because of both its
interest in the growing economic opportunities in East Asia and its own concerns about US
bilateralism.
The United States, in its hitherto unsuccessful attempt to secure a ‘fast track’, has
recently reiterated its interest in preferential trading arrangements with Australia, Chile,
New Zealand and Singapore. Australia, at least, will again reject the overture, as a potentially
disastrous diversion from its strategic interests in East Asia.
The ‘Realpolitik’ in trade policy that has been a raging fashion in Washington is as likely
to run into the sand as conquer the Pacific. If it does, it will be because of the strength and
steadiness of Japan and the East Asian economies in holding to their goal of open regionalism
in Asia and the Pacific and defending their abiding interest in the health of the WTO system.
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